BMJ Open publishes all reviews undertaken for accepted manuscripts. Reviewers are asked to complete a checklist review form (http://bmjopen.bmj.com/site/about/resources/checklist.pdf) and are provided with free text boxes to elaborate on their assessment. These free text comments are reproduced below.
INTRODUCTION
The research question is not specified. The paragraph focuses on different criticalities related to medications but none of them is clearly assigned to MUPs. The aim of the paper is vague and not clear. So, it is necessary to clarify: -Which is the problem the authors addressed and why it is important. -State what is lacking in the current knowledge -State the objectives of your study or the research question.
Improve also the setting description. Are there any medication protocols/practices in use in the two hospitals?
METHODS
The structure of the paper is chaotic, e.g. methods are described in the Introduction section: Human Factor and HFMEA should be placed in methods paragraph. Methods and protocol design are not described in sufficient detail to replicate the protocol. They need to be deeply improved.
It could be valuable to include a timetable/gantt with all protocol activities for each months (M1-M12).
Provide more details for settings. How many units are analyzed for each hospital? The choice of the participants could be interesting to read to reply the study. I suggest to synthetically describe this section adding explicative tables for each hospital with the unit and the healthcare workers involved. Moreover, for each unit it is interesting to list the MUPs so it is possible to understand what are the MUPs and who are the actors involved.
Explain the composition of the study team.
Provide a brief explanation of the used software (e.g., MAXQDA). It seems that the information acquired during this stage are important inputs for an effective HFMEA. EXPECTED RESULTS (missing and suggested paragraph) The findings or expected findings are not reported. HFMEA has many preliminary results and expected ones that could be clearly indicated: -Graphical description of the focus process with the flowchart. -List of the failure modes-causes and effects for each activity. -List of critical failure mode. I propose to select a critical process, and consider applying the protocol with a human factor analysis (inclusive of HTA diagram) and a detailed HFMEA analysis. DISCUSSION (missing and suggested paragraph) In the Introduction and Discussion, key arguments are not backed up by appropriate references. The Discussion does not provide an answer to the research question. There is a wrong affirmation in the discussion ' There is no defined hazard score threshold to indicate when a failure mode should be considered for further analysis'. According to DeRosier, J., E. Stalhandske, J. P. Bagian and T. Nudell (2002) . "Using health care Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: the VA National Center for Patient Safety's prospective risk" a failure mode with hazard score of 8 can be considered critical and eligible for further analysis (decision tree inputs).
Most references are required for methodological assertions: Page 9 line 43 'the prioritization of HFMEA is more robust than in FMEA'.
Page 15 -the strategy adopted for the hazard analysis with A) and B) groups and moments requires references of HFMEA studies that adopted similar solutions because it is very different from HFMEA procedure.
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GENERAL COMMENTS
I think that this study protocol is very interesting. I think that the authors clearly state their goals, and the methods align well with those goals. The authors clearly state the limitations and concerns of the protocol (Hawthorne effect specifically)...
I suggest the authors soften their language a bit in the introduction and background. While the statements are well-supported and in my opinion, true, softening the language in a few key places would increase readability and credibility.
Also, the exhibits,need to be titled, referenced, notated etc. The spreadsheet detailing Steps 3-5 is kind of confusing. It may be helpful to provide a few examples rather than the call outs. That would make much more sense and would make this exhibit extremely useful for researchers wanting to recreate this study.
I look forward to seeing the results of this study published.
VERSION 1 -AUTHOR RESPONSE
Reviewer Comment Authors' Response NB: Page numbers refer to pages in the clean version of the manuscript
General comments
R1.01: "The study does not seem to be well planned. It is not clear how the protocol was designed (who will do what, when and how)."
To improve the clarity of the study protocol, we have made the following revisions:
-Pg. 7, We added text to the "Overview" in the "Methods and Analysis" to introduce the integration of the two major parts/methods of the study: "Our study is comprised of two integrated parts, as one (clinical observations) informs the other (risk analysis). Figure 1 describes the study design, showing the order of the steps from each part." - Figure 1 : We have inserted an additional figure (first mentioned on page 7). The figure describes how the two parts of the study methods will be integrated, including the order of the steps belonging to the clinical observations and HFMEA.
To clarify who will do what, we made reference to the study team consistent throughout the manuscript, as our earlier version made reference to both the "study" team as well as the "research" team. Similarly, to distinguish between the study team and the HFMEA team, we have made sure that the first reference to "team" in each paragraph is indicated as either the study team or the HFMEA team.
-Pg. 9, 10, 13, 20, Reference added to the "study team" -Pg. 9, 11, 19, Reference to "research team" was replaced by "study team" -Pg. 13, 14, 17, Reference added to the "HFMEA team"
Additional details were added to the "Methods and Analysis" section to provide more information on how the study will be conducted.
-Pg. 11, Added "Emerging findings will be confirmed with healthcare workers in the units." and "Coding of the observational data in MAXQDA© will create a dataset that is structured so that the study team can search and filter data related to specific MUP tasks, roles, technologies, or environments." -Pg. 13, Added "After the study team defines the topic that will be analyzed and assembles a multidisciplinary team, information from the clinical observations will be used to map process flow diagrams" -Pg. 14, Added "The team will communicate over email as well as during in-person meetings. A minimum of five in-person meetings for each clinical unit will take place to cover the graphical description of the MUPs; identification and description of failure modes; assignment of severity and probability scores; decision tree analysis and identification of critical failure modes, causes, and controls; and actions and outcome measures. These meetings are embedded within the remaining steps described below." -Pg. 14, added "collaboratively between observers" R1.02: "It would be interesting to better understand the interactions between the two main steps."
To provide the reader with a better sense of how the clinical observations and HFMEA are integrated, we have made the following revisions:
-Pg. 7, We added text to the "Overview" in the "Methods and Analysis" to introduce the integration of the two major parts/methods of the study: "Our study is comprised of two integrated parts, as one (clinical observations) informs the other (risk analysis). Figure 1 describes the study design, showing the order of the steps from each part." - Figure 1 : We have inserted an additional figure (first mentioned on page 7). The figure describes how the two parts of the study methods will be integrated, including the order of the steps belonging to the clinical observations and HFMEA. -Pg. 11, We added text to link the use of coded of observational data as inputs for conducting the HFEMA: "Coding of the observational data in MAXQDA© will create a dataset that is structured so that the study team can search and filter data related to specific MUP tasks, roles, technologies, or environments. These are important inputs for conducting the HFMEA, providing not only information on how tasks were performed and by whom but also contextual information for conducting the hazard analysis described below." -Pg. 14, We added "clinical" to emphasize the use of the information collected during the clinical observations in step 3 of the HFMEA. R1.03: "In this shape the paper is only introductive to a general overview of the protocol and it is not possible to appreciate the originality of the study."
Pg. 6, Under the subsection "Gaps in understanding vulnerabilities for diversion in hospital medication use processes", we revised the text and inserted the following to highlight the novelty of the study:
-"To address this gap, we propose a study designed to map two hospitals' MUPs and systematically identify vulnerabilities in these processes that increase the risk for diversion. To our knowledge, this is the first study to prospectively and systematically investigate the vulnerabilities compromising the security and accounting of medications across the scope of hospital MUPs, as opposed to confined to a specific task or process, and to suggest mitigation strategies." Comments specific to the introduction R1.04: "The research question is not specified. The paragraph focuses on different criticalities related to medications but none of them is clearly assigned to MUPs. The aim of the paper is vague and not clear. So, it is necessary to clarify: -Which is the problem the authors addressed and why it is important. -State what is lacking in the current knowledge -State the objectives of your study or the research question."
The structure of the introduction has been revised to add clarity and focus.
-Pg. 4, In the "Introduction", we have revised the text and present the problem, gap and impact:  Problem: "Weaknesses in the security and accounting of CS in hospitals enables medications to be lost or diverted.
[13] It is increasingly recognized that Canadian hospitals lack robust processes and infrastructure to accurately track and resolve discrepancies in their CS inventory. For example, of the 1020 incidents of CS losses and thefts detected and reported by Canadian hospitals to Health Canada in 2016,[9] over 80% were reported as unexplained losses, meaning that at the time of reporting (i.e., within 10 days of discovery), the loss could not be attributed to any particular cause or action."  Gap: "What has not been explored are the vulnerabilities within the hospital medication use process (MUP; e.g., procurement, storage, preparation, prescription, dispensing, administration, reconciliation, waste, return, removal) that increase the potential for diversion to occur."  Impact: "With Canadian hospitals experiencing increasingly formal expectations that they will verify and enhance diversion safeguards to protect patients and healthcare workers [14, 15] , they require systematic knowledge about where vulnerabilities exist and advice and guidance on how to mitigate these risks." -Pg. 5, We inserted a section subheading to further describe the gap ("Gap in understanding vulnerabilities for diversion in hospital medication use processes") -Pg. 6, We inserted a section subheading for "Objectives" and revised the wording for clarity: "The objectives of this study are to understand the security and accounting of medications throughout the MUP in two Ontario hospitals, to identify vulnerabilities and existing safeguards, and to proactively identify opportunities for improvement." R1.05: "Page 9 line 43 'the prioritization of HFMEA is more robust than in FMEA'." [Requires a reference]
We revised the text in the "HFMEA Overview" and in doing so, removed that statement:
Pg. 12: "The HFMEA approach was developed to address criticisms of using FMEA in healthcare, particularly with respect to the use of a single risk priority number (RPN) to rank vulnerabilities.
[55] The RPN in FMEA is calculated by multiplying scores from three ordinal scales: severity, probability and detectability. Multiplying these scores creates an RPN that is mathematically flawed, unstable (small changes in one score can lead to large changes in RPN), and masks important distinctions. [55] [56] [57] . For example, a failure mode with high detectability, high probability, but low severity would be prioritized the same as a failure mode with high detectability, low probability, but high severity despite having different risk implications. [55] Given that failure modes with the highest RPN would be considered as hazards with the highest priority, efforts may be misdirected based on a misleading RPN score. HFMEA addresses these concerns by prioritizing vulnerabilities using a decision tree analysis. The decision tree analysis considers not only severity and probability scores, but also assesses the criticality of the failures (i.e., single point weaknesses) and whether there are controls in place to prevent or detect these failures. The use of "yes" and "no" responses in the HFMEA decision tree to assess the criticality, presence of control measures, and detectability of the failure modes[46] is less subjective and more easily agreed upon than assigning scores.
[58]" R2.01: "I suggest the authors soften their language a bit in the introduction and background. While the statements are well-supported and in my opinion, true, softening the language in a few key places would increase readability and credibility."
We have reviewed the manuscript and softened the language in a few places. For example:
-Pg. 4, We revised "shows" to "suggests" and removed "clearly" -Pg. 5, We removed "particularly" -Pg. 5, We added "suspension or termination" Comments specific to the methods and analysis R1.06: "Improve also the setting description. Are there any medication protocols/practices in use in the two hospitals?"
We added additional details to the setting description added Table 1 , which describes the setting, processes, and personnel for each unit.
-Pg. 7, Added "large (over 400 acute care beds) fullservice hospitals" -Pg. 8, Added "Several process tasks are expected to follow similar procedures/protocols given that both hospitals have central inpatient pharmacies that distribute unit-dosed medications to the floors, have ADCs on the clinical units, and operate within the same provincial health system. However, some process tasks are expected to differ between hospitals and clinical units because of differences in technologies (e.g., use of different ADCs) and protocols (e.g., requirement of a witness for wasting). For example, emergency departments often use paper documentation of medication orders and administration, whereas electronic systems are used to record these events in the intensive care units." - Table 1 , added to describe the setting, processes, and personnel for each unit R1.07: "The structure of the paper is chaotic, e.g. methods are described in the Introduction section: Human Factor and HFMEA should be placed in methods paragraph. Methods and protocol design are not described in sufficient detail to replicate the protocol. They need to be deeply improved.
It could be valuable to include a timetable/gantt with all protocol activities for each months (M1-M12)."
The structure of the paper has been revised. The description of HFMEA has been moved to the Methods and Analysis section (pg. 11). We have removed the description of Human Factors from the paper, as it was a very general description. To improve the flow of the paper, we have focused the writing on the two methods used: clinical observations and HFMEA and have added additional details to those.
We have added figures to provide more detail and give the reader a sense of the process and anticipated outputs.
- Figure 1 shows the study design and how the clinical observations are integrated into the HFMEA steps. - Figure 2 presents an example of a process task and subtask diagram. It shows how critical failure modes and controls will be mapped onto the subtasks and demonstrates how the results from the two sites will be presented side-by-side to enable comparisons. - Figure 5 presents an example of how the critical failure modes and controls (flagged in Figure 2 ) will be presented and described. R1.08: "Provide more details for settings. How many units are analyzed for each hospital?"
The number of units (three) that will be observed in each of the two hospitals is described under the "Setting" subsection. Also, the added Table 1 describes the sites in more detail. See our response to R1.06 for description of additional details added to the manuscript to describe the setting. R1.09: "The choice of the participants could be interesting to read to reply the study. I suggest to synthetically describe this section adding explicative tables for each hospital with the unit and the healthcare workers involved. Moreover, for each unit it is interesting to list the MUPs so it is possible to understand what are the MUPs and who are the actors involved."
We have added Table 1 to describe the processes and personnel that we expect to observe in each of the three units.
R1.10: "Explain the composition of the study team."
We have added a description of the study team to the "Methods and Analysis, Overview": -Pg. 7, "The study team is comprised of five health services researchers with backgrounds in medication safety, three (MD, MF and PT) with expertise in human factors, one with clinical experience as a hospital pharmacist (DT) and one as a practising physician (MH)."
We describe the HFMEA team in the "Methods and Analysis" HFMEA step 2:
-Pg. 13, "The HFMEA team will be comprised of three human factors specialists, two pharmacists, one physician, two nurses, and two pharmacy technicians. The membership of the team ensures there is expertise in collecting and analysing observational data and proactive risk analysis, as well as knowledge and experience working in the different hospital settings and performing tasks covering the breadth of the MUP." R1.11: "Provide a brief explanation of the used software (e.g., MAXQDA). It seems that the information acquired during this stage are important inputs for an effective HFMEA."
We added a description of how the observational data coded in MAXQDA would be used during the HFMEA to the subsection "Coding of observation data": -Pg. 11, "Coding of the observational data in MAXQDA© will create a dataset that is structured so that the study team can search and filter data related to specific MUP tasks, roles, technologies, or environments. These are important inputs for conducting the HFMEA, providing not only information on how tasks were performed and by whom but also contextual information for conducting the hazard analysis described below." R1.12: "Human factor analysis (task analysis) and HFMEA requires more details. See these references:
Anam Parand, Giuliana Faiella, Bryony Dean Franklin, Maximilian
We thank the reviewer for providing example references. In response to this comment, we have included two additional figures (Figures 2 & 5) that provide a deeper description of the anticipated outputs of the HFMEA task and hazard analysis. We have removed the description of Human Factors as it was a very general description, but have added the following details describing the HFMEA: -Pg. 11, We added text to describe the means of correspondence between the HFMEA team as well as the aspects of the HFMEA that will be covered during 5 in-person meetings: "The team will communicate over email as well as during in-person meetings. A minimum of five in-person meetings for each clinical unit will take place to cover the graphical description of the MUPs; identification and description of failure modes; assignment of severity and probability scores; decision tree analysis and identification of critical failure modes, causes, and controls; and actions and outcome measures. These meetings are embedded within the remaining steps described below." -Pg. 15, We introduce Figure 2 that provides a detailed example of the task and subtask flow diagrams that will be produced: " Figure 2 shows an example of the task and subtask figure that will be constructed from the process flow diagrams produced in this step of the HFMEA." -Pg. Figure 2 shows which subtasks are associated with critical failure modes at each site using FM1, FM2, etc. as markers. When one site has a control in place to mitigate a critical failure mode identified in the other site, this is flagged with C1, C2, etc. Figure 5 provides a description of the corresponding critical failure mode and controls." R1.13: "the strategy adopted for the hazard analysis with A) and B) groups and moments requires references of HFMEA studies that adopted similar solutions because it is very different from HFMEA procedure."
Although we followed the standard HFMEA strategy for the hazard analysis, what is novel about our approach is that we will compare and contrast the HFMEAs between two sites to highlight different critical failure modes and potential controls. To our knowledge, others have not published a similar strategy of comparing HFMEAs for two sites. This has been highlighted by the following revisions: -Pg. 13, We added text describing the uniqueness of our approach of conducting HFMEA for two sites: "Unique to our study is that the HFMEA will be conducted for the same processes at two sites, enabling us to find similarities and differences in processes, failure modes, and controls." -Figures 2 & 5, We added these figures to show how the results from the two sites will be presented sideby-side. FM1, FM2, etc. are used to flag the subtasks where critical failure modes are identified, and C1, C2, etc. flag the subtasks that act as controls for critical failure modes identified at the other site. R2.02: "Also, the exhibits, need to be titled, referenced, notated etc. The spreadsheet detailing
The reviewer is correct in that the figure titles are not visible below the exhibits in the proof; however, they are included on page 22 under the section "Legend of Tables and Steps 3-5 is kind of confusing. It may be helpful to provide a few examples rather than the call outs. That would make much more sense and would make this exhibit extremely useful for researchers wanting to recreate this study." 
Comments to include two additional paragraphs: Expected Results and Discussion
R1.14: Reviewer 1 suggested the addition of an "Expected Results" paragraph and a "Discussion" paragraph
We have kept the headings of the manuscript aligned with those outlined by the BMJ Open protocol guidelines. However, as suggested, we have added "expected results" and discussion in the "Conclusion" (Pg. 20).
R1.15: "The findings or expected findings are not reported. HFMEA has many preliminary results and expected ones that could be clearly indicated: -Graphical description of the focus process with the flowchart. -List of the failure modes-causes and effects for each activity. -List of critical failure mode. I propose to select a critical process, and consider applying the protocol with a human factor analysis (inclusive of HTA diagram) and a detailed HFMEA analysis."
We have included a series of figures that describe the structure of the worksheets and anticipated tasks/subtask diagram and failure mode results table.
- Figure 3 : Example of the worksheet that will be filled out by the HFMEA team during steps 3, 4 and 5 of the HFMEA. - Figure 2 : As suggested, this figure provides an example of the task and subtasks for one of the processes (the distribution of controlled substances to the ADC on hospital floors). This figure shows how critical failure modes and controls associated with subtasks will be indicated. It also shows how both hospital sites' processes will be compared. The manuscript has been reviewed for places where references are required, and we have added references where appropriate.
-Pg. 12, We added reference 55 to the description of Healthcare Failure Mode and Effects Analysis -Pg. 20, We added references 62, 58, 63 and 64 to the "Limitations" R1.17: "The Discussion does not provide an answer to the research question."
We have added a "Conclusion" section to describe how the study protocol will address the study objectives. Text was moved from the "Methods and Results" section into the "Conclusion" and revised.
-Pg. 20, "It is expected that the clinical observations and HFMEA will lead to an understanding of the current workflows and failure modes affecting the MUP in one community and one academic hospital. Results of this analysis will allow for a comparison of workflows, failure modes, and controls between hospitals and as a function of clinical area (e.g., emergency department versus intensive care unit).
Identification of critical failure modes and controls will demonstrate where vulnerabilities exist for diversion or unintentional loss and how they can be mitigated, including those related to the physical security as well as the documentation and accounting of CS." R1.17: "There is a wrong affirmation in the discussion ' There is no defined hazard score threshold to indicate when a failure mode should be considered for further analysis'. According to DeRosier, J., E. Stalhandske, J. P. Bagian and T. Nudell (2002) . "Using health care Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: the VA National Center for Patient Safety's prospective risk" a failure mode with hazard score of 8 can be considered critical and eligible for further analysis (decision tree inputs)."
The reviewer is correct that a cut-off of 8 has been described as an appropriate cut-off by DeRosier et al. (2002) and used by others to determine how failure modes should flow through the decision tree. We realize that our discussion of what is meant by "considered for further analysis" is not clear. Further, since this point is not a main limitation, we have opted to omit this text from the limitations section of the manuscript.
Additional revisions made to the manuscript
Described the observations consistently as "clinical" observations instead of "naturalistic" -Title -Methods and analysis, Abstract (pg. 2) -Methods and analysis, Overview (pg. 7) -Methods and analysis, Setting (pg. 7) -Methods and analysis, HFMEA, 3. Graphically describe the process (pg. 14)
Removed references to observations planned in the operating room. As the planning of this study has progressed, we have decided to limit the scope to three units (inpatient pharmacy, intensive care unit, and emergency department). 
